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Abstract—The paper presents a set of concepts which can 
establish a basis for the creation of new evaluation model of trust 
and reputation management systems (TRM). The presented 
approach takes into account essential characteristics of such 
systems to provide an assessment of its robustness. The model also 
specifies measures of effectiveness of trust and reputation systems.  
There is still a need to create a comprehensive evaluation model of 
attacks on trust and reputation management systems and 
evaluation model of TRM systems itself, which could facilitate 
establishing a framework to deeply evaluate the security of existing 
TRM systems. We believe that this paper could be perceived as a 
small step forward towards this goal.  
 
Keywords—trust, reputation, attacks, trust and reputation 
management system, TRM, attacks on trust and reputation 
management systems 
I. INTRODUCTION 
RUST and reputation management (TRM) systems are 
built on the notion of trust and reputation taken from 
humanities and social sciences. The analogy is quite simple:  
in a society, citizens are establishing social relations, in an 
information system (or in a network) many agents (nodes) exist 
which can establish interactions and provide or make use of 
different services (for example packet forwarding, files sharing, 
etc.). In a society, social relations can be characterized by trust 
between two citizens or by reputation of a citizen.  
In an information system analogic notion of trust can be used as 
a measure of the reliability of an agent. Like in society, the level 
of trust to another agent depends on the history  
of interactions with that agent and also on recommendations 
(opinions) of other agents about that particular agent.  
The evaluation of trust on the basis of TRM systems, facilitates 
to make a rational decision about selection of an agent to  
an interaction, especially when agents which could act selfishly 
or maliciously are present. Because of that TRM systems could 
lead to risk reduction in interactions between autonomous 
agents [1]. The idea behind trust and reputation management 
systems gets significance because of the fact that conventional 
security measures (based on cryptography) are often not 
sufficient [2], [3], [4]. Trust and reputation systems are a 
systematic approach to build security on the basis  
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The main area in which TRM systems can be applied is the 
problem of choosing a service provider (an agent to  
an interaction). In a system (or network) can be many agents 
from different autonomous systems (governed by different 
entities). 
Agents can provide services with a certain quality, but 
providing a service is associated with a certain cost which is 
related to the quality of service. Some agents can be selfish (they 
try to maximize own gain) or malicious (they try to disrupt the 
system). Because of that, before an agent will request a service 
from another agent, it want to estimate the reliability of that 
agent and choose the agent which is the most reliable. This can 
be done on the basis of history of node’s own interactions and 
recommendations received from other agents.  
TRM system defines the way of calculation of parameters 
which characterize other agents (such as trust or reputation)  
as well as the way of exchanging information between agents. 
Trust can be perceived as a value of confidence that an agent 
(trustee) will provide a requested service to another agent 
(trustor). Of course, trust is calculated by the trustor. Reputation 
can be perceived as a global opinion about an agent in a certain 
context. TRM systems can use either the notion of trust or 
reputation or both of them. 
Trust and reputation management systems can be applied in 
many areas, such as: e-commerce (auction sites, online stores), 
WSN (Wireless Sensor Networks), MANET (Mobile Ad hoc 
Networks), P2P (Peer-to-Peer) networks and also social 
networks in broad sense. Any system which can process any 
type of recommendations, can gain much benefits from 
application of a TRM system. Applications to fight against 
many types of spams (for example e-mail or phone spam) can 
also be built on the basis of trust and reputation systems.  
TRM systems give not only benefits but also could be  
a thread itself. In fact, many attacks on trust and reputation 
systems exist. Researchers usually concentrate on new TRM 
systems’ proposals or on creating taxonomy of such systems [5], 
[6], but in many papers, authors claim that the weaknesses of 
TRM systems still do not gained enough attention [7]. Until 
now, there is no acknowledged comprehensive methodology of 
evaluation of trust and reputation management systems [8] and 
this is a serious problem related to TRM systems. 
This work contains a description of generalization of trust and 
reputation management systems which can be used to evaluate 
reliability of such systems in the context of preventing various 
attacks. Presented assumptions about evaluation model of TRM 
systems and of attacks on such systems are general.  
It means that the model can be used in various types of networks 
and applications (despite of characteristic of agents or 
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characteristic of services provided by agents). This paper can be 
perceived as a summary and an extension of earlier works 
conducted by the author (especially: [9] and [10]), related to 
constructing evaluation model of TRM systems and model of 
attacks on such systems. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
Many taxonomies of TRM systems as well of attacks on such 
systems exist, although to the best of our knowledge there is no 
general characteristic of TRM systems which could be used to 
provide a comprehensive evaluation model of such systems 
A survey of existing models of TRM systems can be found in 
paper [11]. In the paper authors contend that, because of 
disadvantages of existing models, there is still a need to create 
new models, which could be used to create a comprehensive 
framework to compare such systems and evaluate their 
effectiveness (for example in the context of attack prevention). 
Article [12] contains extensive and comprehensive survey of 
trust and reputation models as well as a classification of such 
systems. Many trust and reputation systems are also presented 
in [6]. 
However, in some of the existing works, measures of 
effectiveness of TRM systems as well as of attack on such 
systems, are defined, the evaluation on the basis of such 
measures may be not sufficient. The paper [13] proposes a few 
measures of effectiveness of TRM systems, e.g.  Malicious 
Node Detection Performance – MDP, which represents the 
average rate of detection of malicious nodes (agents) and False 
Alarms Rate – FAR, which represents the average ratio of 
mistakes during classification of reliability of nodes. The main 
problem with such measures lies in fact that in practice, most of 
the TRM systems during trust assessment do not use binary 
values (which could be used to classify nodes as benevolent or 
malicious), and because of that such measures are not precise. 
In paper [14] very similar approach is presented by the measure 
of Detection Accuracy. In some other papers regarding TRM 
systems, measures like: Packet Delivery Ratio[15], Packet Loss 
Ratio [15] and also Energy Consumption (by the TRM system 
itself) [14], [15] are defined. Of course, such measures can only 
be applied to few types of trust and reputation management 
systems (namely the types, which could be used to support 
routing protocols, for example in WSN or MANET networks), 
but cannot be applied to TRM systems in general. 
There are many papers, which concentrate on attacks on trust 
and reputation management systems [2], [6], [7], [12], [16]-[20], 
many taxonomies of such attacks can also be found: [17], [19], 
[21]. The most common criteria of classification of attacks are 
the following: 
• the level of knowledge of attackers about the TRM 
system [17], 
• mechanisms used by the attackers (the decision in 
which step of TRM system, attackers take the 
malicious actions) [21], 
• the aim of the attack [17], [19]. 
• directness of the attack [17], 
• the number of the attackers (individual, group or 
collective attacks) [17]. 
Other criteria also exist (such as specified in [20]). 
Many papers try to analyse TRM systems in the context of 
resilience to a certain attacks, but this can be perceived as an 
example of a reactive approach which is based on detection of 
certain attack signature [2], [13], [17], [20]-[22]. Such approach 
has very important disadvantages, more comprehensive 
described in [8]. Because of that more prospective approach can 
be based on creation of description (model) of TRM systems 
and attacks on such systems which could be used to more in-
depth analysis to identify various currently unknown attacks.  
Moreover, in the literature [2] can be found the statement that 
still attacks on trust and reputation management systems have 
not gain enough attention of research teams. The special 
attention should be paid to create a quantitative approach to 
evaluate influence of attacks on TRM systems. 
III. GENERAL MODEL OF TRM SYSTEMS 
Each TRM system works according to the five following steps 
[9]: 
1. Information gathering by observing interactions of 
other nodes, requesting recommendations from other 
nodes, and storing the history of previous interactions. 
2. Trust evaluation on the basis of the information 
collected. 
3. Service provider selection. 
4. Interaction and evaluation of the interaction. 
5. Punishing or rewarding (i.e. increasing or decreasing 
the value of trust to a node which have provided the 
service), depending on the assessment of the 
interaction’s quality. 
Information gathering is the most vulnerable step, because 
malicious nodes may present incorrect recommendations during 
this step. Malicious nodes can affect the trust assessment by 
manipulating the quality of services provided, and because of 
that also step 4 is vulnerable to malicious actions. 
 
Fig. 1. Five steps of TRM systems 
1) Information gathering 
Trust and Reputation Management systems can use the 
following information types: 
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• recommendations from other nodes (in TRM systems, 
which use recommendations),  
• information about interactions of other nodes (it can be 
used only in systems, which store information about 
interactions in central database or in systems which 
facilitate providing such information to other nodes),  
• nodes’ own observations of interaction between other 
nodes.  
It is worth to note that recommendations could be provided at 
least in two different ways:  
• periodically (e.g. on every certain number interactions 
or after certain time), 
• on request. 
2) Trust evaluation and ranking  
The way of aggregation of various types of information and 
creating ranking on that basis, is one of the most important 
characteristic of a TRM system. The most important differences 
between systems are a result of this step of the process. 
3) Service provider selection 
The most important ways of selection node as a service 
provider (partner of the interaction) are:  
• selection of a node which are the most trustful, 
• selection of a node from the group of nodes in which 
trust to any node is higher than a certain threshold.  
4) Interaction and the evaluation of interaction 
The evaluation of the interaction could be done in discrete or 
continuous values. During evaluation the following issues 
should be taken into consideration:  
• the possibility of mistakes in the assessment process 
(for example because of external disruptions),  
• time from interaction to the moment, in which the 
evaluation could take place.  
5) Punishing and rewarding 
During this step an agent (a node) can increase trust to other 
nodes (as reward for good recommendations or good service) or 
decrease trust to other nodes (as a punishment for wrong 
recommendations or bad service).  
IV. MODEL OF TRUST AND REPUTATION MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEMS 
The main idea behind trust and reputation management 
systems is the assessment that a node can evaluate trust to other 
nodes in the network. We assume that two groups of classes of 
trust (or reputation) can be distinguished: action trust and 
recommendation trust. 
• Action trust refers to the probability that evaluated 
node will perform the service or action with 
satisfactory quality for the evaluator. 
• Recommendation trust refers to the probability that 
evaluated node will deliver to the evaluator correct 
recommendation about action trust of another node. 
We assume that every node in the network can evaluate trust 
values (which belong to one of these two groups). It is worth to 
 
note that some of TRM systems in practice use only one general 
trust value, but this fact is not reduce the usefulness of the 
presented model. 
A. Symbols 
Let us denominate: 
𝑁      – the set of all nodes in the network, 
𝑛 – the total number of  nodes (𝑛 = 𝑛𝑀 + 𝑛𝐵), 
𝑀 –  the set of malicious or selfish nodes, 
𝑛𝑀 –  the number of malicious or selfish nodes, 
𝐵 –  the set of benevolent nodes,  
𝑛𝐵 – the number of benevolent nodes, 
𝑖, 𝑗 and 𝑘 – node number 𝑖, 𝑗 or 𝑘 respectively, 
𝑡 –  time (it can be defined discreetly - as the moment of 
the interaction), 
𝑅𝑖:𝑘
𝑡   –  recommendation trust of node k to node i at time t  
(or during interaction number 𝑡), 
𝑇𝑖:𝑘
𝑡    –  action trust of node k to node i at time t (or during 
interaction number 𝑡), 
𝑇𝑇𝑖:𝑘
𝑡  –  total trust of node k to node i at time t (or during 
interaction number 𝑡), total trust can be dependent of 
action trust of other nodes to node 𝑖 and of 
recommendation trust of node 𝑘 to other nodes, 
𝑜𝑖    –    the outcome of i-th interaction (i is the global number 
of interaction in the whole network) -  𝑜𝑖  provides 
information about quality of interaction (service 
provide by a node), we can assume that 𝑜 ∈< 0,1 > 
where o = 1 identify the best quality of a service and 
𝑜 = 0 identify the lack of the service, 
m    –    the  total number of interactions in the network. 
Values of parameters such as 𝑅𝑖:𝑘
𝑡   𝑇𝑖:𝑘
𝑡 , 𝑇𝑇𝑖:𝑘
𝑡  can be discrite 
or continuous over a defined range. In case of some trust and 
reputation management systems these values could even be 
expressed in words (e.g.: high level of trust, low level of trust, 
undefined trust). 
Complete description of a trust and reputation management 
system could be achieved by defining the character of the 
following parameters and functions:  
• applied classes of action and recommendation trust - 
CTx, 𝐶𝑅𝑥: where 𝑥 denote the number of class of action 
or recommendation trust. Earlier in all symbols we 
have assumed (to simplify) that in a TRM system there 
can be only one class of action trust, and 
recommendation trust, but in general more such classes 
could exist. The generalization, by implementing more 
classes of action or reputation trust can be easily done, 
and it will not affect the correctness of conclusions.  
• possible values of recommendations for each class of 
recommendation trust - VRx; 
• possible values of action trust for each class - VTx; 
• trust assessment function TTi:k
t =  FT(Fdt, Fit), where 
Fdt is a certain function which arguments are values of 
trust after former interactions (which is: Ti:k
t ), and 
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can be perceived as a function which arguments are 
values of recommendations delivered by other nodes  
(which is: Ri:k
t ); 
• node selection function - FC( ); 
• recommendation deliver function - FR( ), which define 
how recommendation for other nodes should be 
calculated; 
• interaction assessment function - FO( ); 
• recommendation assessment function - FOR( ); 
• frequency of issuing recommendations - fR; 
• parameters of node selection function (for example  
a threshold of trust, below which a node cannot be 
selected as a service provider) - Pi
FT , where i denotes 
the number of a parameter. 
B. The model 
Before the interaction, the node which needs service has to 
choose service provider. It can be done through evaluation of 
trust to all possible service providers. It is done by calculating 
𝐹𝑇( ) = 𝑇𝑇𝑖:𝑘
𝑡  (we assume that node k is willing to find total trust 
of node i because is willing to interact with node i).  
The way in which the node will choose the service provider is 
defined by the node’s selection function FC( ), which is defined 
by the TRM system itself, but in general the node can select 
service provider in two ways: 
1. Node i which needs service, choose node with the 
highest value of total trust among all nodes known by 
node i 
2. Node i which needs service, choose the service 
provider randomly with the probability dependent on 
𝑇𝑇𝑖:𝑘
𝑡  
After interaction, node k updates action trust to node i (which 
have provided requested service). In general, it is done by 
increasing action trust when the service/interaction was 
satisfying or decreasing otherwise. Of course, the way in which 
node k makes that update is defined by interaction assessment 
function - 𝑇𝑖:𝑘
𝑡 = FO( ). 
Node k also update recommendation trust values to nodes 
which have provided recommendations about node i.  
In general node k increases the recommendation trust to nodes, 
which has provided correct recommendations, and decreases the 
recommendation trust to nodes which has provided wrong 
recommendations. The way in which node k makes that update 
is defined by recommendation assessment function:  
𝑅𝑗:𝑘
𝑡 = 𝐹𝑂𝑅( ). 
C. The measures of effectiveness 
To measure the effectiveness of TRM systems (and also the 
effectiveness of attacks on TRM systems) we propose the 
following parameters: 
The network effectiveness (E), which can be defined  
as proportion of sum of outcomes of all interactions to the 
number of all interactions and can be calculated as follows: 
𝐸 =





The resistance of the system (SE), which can be defined as 
the maximal proportion of the number of malicious nodes which 
are performing the most effective attack to the number of all 
nodes in the network, in which the system effectiveness does not 
fall below a certain value. For example. S0.99 = 0.1 means that 
when the ratio of malicious nodes is 10%, the system 
effectiveness would not fall below 0.99. 





where nM′ can be defined as the maximum number of malicious 
nodes in the network, which could not achieve higher 
degradation of the system (below E). 
The gain of network effectiveness (G), which can be defined 
as the difference between the network effectiveness, in which 
there is a TRM system present (E), and the network 
effectiveness without TRM system implemented (E0), under an 
assumption that in both cases attackers behave in the same way 
(they apply the same strategy of attacks, which could decrease 
the network effectiveness at most) : G = E − E0 
The absolute gain of network effectiveness (GA), which can 
be defined as the difference between the network effectiveness, 
in which there is a TRM system present (E), and the network 
effectiveness without TRM system implemented (E0′), under an 
assumption that in both cases attackers can apply different 
strategy of attacks to decrease the network effectiveness: GA =
E − E0′ 
It is worth noting that from above definitions: GA ≥ G, 
because of the fact that: E0′ ≤ E0. 
D. The measures of aggregated trust or reputation values 
The following parameters were defined to measure actual 
effectiveness of TRM system (on the basis of trust evaluation 
made by benevolent nodes). It is worth to note that these 
parameters can be calculated only when there is a possibility to 
identify malicious nodes (which in practice can be done only in 
controlled environment, for example during simulations). 
The following measures of aggregated trust are defined under 
the assumption that only one class of action trust and only one 
class of recommendation trust are distinguished by the TRM 
system. In case of more class of action or recommendation trust, 
the following measures can be easily adjusted.  
Action reputation of all malicious nodes (𝑇𝐺;𝑀:𝐵
𝑡 ), which can 
be calculated as the sum of action trust to all malicious nodes in 
the opinions of all benevolent nodes. For all i, j: 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗: 
𝑇𝐺;𝑀:𝐵







where i is the i-th node in the set of benevolent nodes, j is the j-
th node in the set of malicious nodes. 
Action reputation of all benevolent nodes (𝑇𝐺;𝐵:𝐵
𝑡 ), which can 
be calculated as the sum of action trust to all benevolent nodes 
in the opinions of all other benevolent nodes: 
𝑇𝐺;𝐵:𝐵
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The measures of reputation of all malicious and benevolent 
nodes in the context of other class of trust (or reputation), can 
be defined in a similar way. For example in the context of 
recommendation reputation, these parameters can be defined as: 
Recommendation reputation of all malicious nodes (𝑅𝐺;𝑀:𝐵
𝑡 ), 
which can be calculated as the sum of recommendation trust to 
all malicious nodes in the opinions of all benevolent nodes. For 
all i, j 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗: 
𝑅𝐺;𝑀:𝐵







Recommendation reputation of all malicious nodes (𝑅𝐺;𝐵:𝐵
𝑡 ), 
which can be calculated as the sum of recommendation trust to 
all benevolent nodes in the opinions of all other benevolent 
nodes: 
𝑅𝐺;𝐵:𝐵







The measures of total reputation (or total global trust), which is 
the way of combining all class of reputation in a way define by 
TRM itself, can be defined likewise: 
Total reputation of all malicious nodes (𝑇𝑇𝐺;𝑀:𝐵
𝑡 ), which can 
be calculated as the sum of total trust to all malicious nodes in 
the opinions of all benevolent nodes. For all i, j 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗: 
𝑇𝑇𝐺;𝑀:𝐵







Total reputation of all benevolent nodes (𝑇𝑇𝐺;𝐵:𝐵
𝑡 ) which can 
be calculated as the sum of recommendation trust to all 
benevolent nodes in the opinions of all other benevolent nodes: 
𝑇𝑇𝐺;𝐵:𝐵







E. Aims of malicious nodes 
In general, malicious nodes aim at decreasing the network 
efficiency. However, malicious nodes may want to achieve 
more sophisticated goals. For example malicious nodes may 
want to prevent successful interactions and communications of 
a selected node.  
The most important conclusion is that malicious nodes have to 
increase RG;M:B
t , TG;M:B
t  and decrease RG;B:B
t , TG;B:B
t  to be able to 
achieve certain goals.  
If malicious nodes gain higher reputation, the probability of 
choosing a benevolent node as a service provider by other 
benevolent nodes could be decreased. On the other hand, in such 
case the probability of choosing a malicious node as a service 
provider by benevolent nodes could be increased.  
It can lead to paralyse the network for some time (as long as 
benevolent nodes do not decrease trust to attackers). Malicious 
nodes could also encourage benevolent nodes to choose always 
the same benevolent node as a service provider. Such behaviour 
can lead to exhaust resources (e.g. energy or processing power) 
of that node and in consequence to eliminate that node from the 
network (this attack can be considered as some kind of DDoS 
attack).  In general gaining higher reputation by malicious nodes 
could enable making greater impact on the network. 
Of course, benevolent nodes aim at increase RG;B:B
t , TG;B:B




F. The characteristic of ideal TRM system 
On the basis of above parameters, it can be stated that an ideal 
TRM system is the system which (despite the fact that malicious 
nodes are present) facilitate to achieve the following values of 
the defined parameters (it can be assumed that all values of trust 
are in the range < 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ;  𝑚𝑎𝑥 >):  
𝑬 = 𝟏 
𝑇𝐺;𝑀:𝐵
𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛,     𝑇𝐺;𝐵:𝐵
𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥,   
𝑅𝐺;𝑀:𝐵
𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛,     𝑅𝐺;𝐵:𝐵
𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥, 
    𝑻𝑻𝑮;𝑴:𝑩
𝒕 = 𝒎𝒊𝒏,     𝑻𝑻𝑮;𝑩:𝑩
𝒕 = 𝒎𝒂𝒙 
lim
𝑥→1
Sx = 1 
𝐺𝐴 = 𝐺 = 1 
V. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORKS 
Evaluation model of trust and reputation management systems 
can be used to evaluate reliability of such systems in 
a quantitative way, especially when malicious agents can be 
present in the system. The question how the resistance for 
various types of attacks on TRM systems can be tested still 
remains open. 
More deeply research are needed to prepare (on the basis of 
presented model) a general model of attacks on trust and 
reputation system to evaluate its usefulness to identify new 
attacks on trust and reputation management systems. The very 
first approaches to prepare such meta-model of attacks are in 
place already: [8], [23] but these approaches also need more 
research. 
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